Why Didn't Georgian Dream Fall?
Experts provide their insights on how the party hung on to power through contested elections and mass demonstrations.
In October 2024, Georgia’s ruling party declared victory in highly contested parliamentary elections. Winning a reported 54% of the national vote, with figures of up to 90% in some regions, Georgian Dream claimed to achieve a decisive electoral victory. During the campaign period, an amalgamated bloc of opposition parties warned that Georgian Dream’s potential victory would lead to further democratic backsliding, greater alignment with Russia, and a turn away from the country’s pro-Western trajectory. Despite disputing the credibility of the initial election results, the opposition was slow to mount a response in the immediate days and weeks following the October vote.
It was not until late November, when Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced the government’s decision to pause Georgia’s EU accession process until 2028, that Georgians began to demonstrate en masse. Tens of thousands took to the streets of Tbilisi and other cities, shutting off major roads and fighting pitched street battles with riot police. Opposition parties demanded new elections be held. To some observers at the time, including these authors, it seemed possible that Georgia had entered into a color revolution style scenario, akin to the Rose Revolution in Georgia 21 years prior.
It has now been over one year since the initial outbreak of mass protests. As Georgian Dream’s consolidation of power has continued, noticeably ramping up after recent local elections, protest turnout on Tbilisi’s Rustaveli Avenue has dwindled, prompting the question of whether the November-December 2024 protests marked a now closed window where momentum had grown to the point that overthrowing the ruling party may have been possible.
To understand why Georgian Dream did not fall during that window (and how it has maintained power since), we have approached nine experts from across Georgia, the United States, and Europe to analyze the following question: “Why didn’t Georgian Dream fall during the November-December 2024 protest wave?”
Across the analysis of our experts, several key themes were highlighted: opposition fragmentation; Georgian Dream’s coercive capacity and institutional capture; nuances in public opinion; and lack of effective sanctions. While this project is by no means a scientific survey, our compilation of analyses aims to identify the factors that have allowed Georgian Dream to maintain power and provide a snapshot of how the expert community is processing what has been a tumultuous year in Georgia.
Opposition Fragmentation
Of the nine experts contacted by ENB, eight identified the fragmentation or dysfunctional nature of Georgia’s opposition as a primary reason for Georgian Dream’s continued rule. For many, this division appeared to be the central factor.
Georgian Dream (GD) survived the late-2024 protest wave because opposition forces lacked the organizational capacity, strategic coherence, and public legitimacy necessary to transform mobilization into sustained political pressure, while the ruling party effectively combined calibrated repression, narrative control, and institutional capture to neutralize dissent.
The protest movement entered the post-election period without a unified strategy for documenting alleged fraud, coordinating sustained mobilization, or outlining a credible transitional governance model. This absence of leadership and direction undermined public confidence and limited the movement’s ability to translate frustration into organized political pressure.
- John DiPirro, Senior Fellow for Eurasia at the American Foreign Policy Council, International Republican Institute Resident Program Director in Georgia 2018-2025.
The 2024 parliamentary elections were seen as the last shred of hope by everyone, apparently except the main players: the opposition political parties. Georgian political opposition was expected to deliver bold, surprising moves that would catch the ruling party off guard and divert it from its well-structured traps. When the central issue at stake is the country’s sovereignty and reorientation of the entire statecraft, this is no longer a matter for activism alone. Resistance to such a shift must necessarily be political; it must be led, organized, and sustained by actors with the legitimacy and capacity to claim power, that is, political parties.
A simple plan of three phases of unavoidable change should have been set in motion: for people, regardless of partisan preference, to demand the change, then to believe it was possible, and finally to identify those capable of winning and governing after victory. Activists and civil society fulfilled their role. The movement proved creative and energetic, thus, the demand for change was overwhelming. Yet political leadership failed to transform that demand into a credible strategy of power.
- Tinatin Khidasheli, Head of Tbilisi-based think tank Civic Idea, former Minister of Defense of Georgia, 2015-2016.
The opposition’s failures were equally notable. Several of the major blocs remained “fan clubs with pretensions of power” rather than programmatic parties, losing the propaganda war by failing to present counter-narratives to Georgian Dream messaging. The persistent push for opposition unity proved counterproductive: if all parties appear affiliated with UNM, Georgian Dream automatically wins because “Never Misha” voters ensure UNM always comes in second. Their parliamentary boycott simply handed all institutional power to the regime.
Most critically, young protesters explicitly rejected both the kotsebi (Georgian Dream) and natsebi (UNM opposition), viewing the entire political class as toxic. This meant the movement had authentic grassroots energy but no political leadership to turn that energy into concrete demands or electoral alternatives. The opposition kept waiting for Washington and Brussels to save them instead of building domestic political power. Meanwhile, unexpected economic growth fueled by Russian money fleeing sanctions meant people weren’t economically desperate. Georgian Dream simply waited for protesters.
- Laura Linderman, Director of Programs for the Central Asia Caucasus Institute.
GD’s Coercive Capacity and Institutional Capture
Also prevalent among respondents, cited by seven out of the nine contacted, was GD’s institutional capture (critically including economic patronage networks) and growing repressive capacity.
Although continuous protests have persisted - blocking Rustaveli Avenue for more than 230 days - the government’s response has become increasingly repressive. While the overt physical violence characteristic of late 2024 has somewhat subsided, the authorities have shifted toward large-scale arrests of activists and the imposition of crippling fines as instruments of control.
To be fair, much of the political opposition operates under severe constraints. Many of its leaders, including all four figures heading the For Change party and numerous representatives of the United National Movement, remain imprisoned. Nevertheless, the core sources of Ivanishvili’s enduring advantage lie in his regime’s systemic control over the electoral process and the persistent weakness and disunity of Georgia’s opposition forces.
- Giorgi Badridze, Senior Fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, former Ambassador of Georgia to the United Kingdom 2009-2014.
The real source of GD’s success is domestic. First, despite its own political isolation and the absence of a program of economic growth and public accountability, Georgian Dream has captured all levers of power – the legislature, the judiciary (especially the procuracy), business, the media, and local government. Georgian Dream, using the immense wealth of its honorary party chairman, Bidzina Ivanishvili, controls the economy. Crucially, a well-paid police force (the army has been neutralized by neglect) is under Georgian Dream’s control. Second, the political and economic space for countervailing power – from civil society, opposition parties, street protest, and universities – has been crushed using financial penalties (fines and the end of grants), sackings, imprisonment, and intimidation. Third, the political opposition has proved incapable of uniting around a common platform. It cannot compete with Georgian Dream using its meagre financial resources. Leaderless street protests, though admirable and heart-warming, never evolved into a multi-pronged strategy of civil resistance. Fourth, the government controlled by Georgian Dream is the most powerful patron of an impoverished Georgian society. The majority of the population outside Tbilisi is dependent on the government’s largesse whether its health insurance, social services, or employment. Most Georgian citizens are fearful of losing their livelihood. Finally, Georgian Dream, through control of information and with the support of the Georgian Orthodox Church – has successfully shaped the dominant narrative - GD is maintaining the peace and protecting Georgia from the danger of war with Russia.
- Stephen Jones, Professor of Modern Georgian History at Ilia State University; Founder and former Director of the Program on Georgian Studies at the Davis Center, Harvard University.
Nuances in Public Opinion
Another key factor cited among responses, seven out of the nine contacted, was nuances in public opinion, specifically between opposition supporters located in Tbilisi, and other voters located in the regions.
Long-term narrative conditioning further weakened mobilization. Through sustained propaganda, media control, and disinformation, GD has cast itself as both national guardian and victim of foreign interference. The opposition, fragmented and often reactive, has struggled to present a compelling alternative vision. As a result, many citizens – particularly those outside Tbilisi – did not view the protests as a necessary defense of democratic principles.
- John DiPirro, Senior Fellow for Eurasia at the American Foreign Policy Council, International Republican Institute Resident Program Director in Georgia 2018-2025.
While protests initially spread beyond Tbilisi to cities like Kutaisi, Batumi, and even medium-sized towns like Khashuri, they couldn’t sustain momentum in the regions where Georgian Dream’s power was most entrenched. The ruling party maintained resilient support through the “administrative resource”—public sector employees dependent on Georgian Dream’s deliberately expanded patronage networks that dominate regions where state employment provides the only stable income. “Never Misha” voters from communities victimized by the 2003-2012 UNM government’s authoritarian excesses refused any return of politicians from that era, while risk-averse older voters convinced by “aba omi ginda?” (So, you want war?) messaging believed opposition victory would provoke Russian aggression. Georgian Dream’s solid 30% core support proved difficult to erode both because no trusted opposition alternative existed and because opposition parties made no serious effort to reach these voters.
- Laura Linderman, Director of Programs for the Central Asia Caucasus Institute.
GD benefits from a civil society sector that has been too reliant on EU and US organizing support and funding relative to domestic funders. This led to noticeable ideological misalignment between the political activists organizing protest and many potential anti-government voters. The latter are uniformly less left-progressive, less secular, and less anti-nationalist than the majority of professional activists. In addition, this reliance made it easy for the government to claim that the organizations providing logistical support for sustained protest are ‘bought’ by outside forces. You may believe all of this is good and proper, that’s entirely fine, but it makes GD’s life much easier - the messaging is not as dissimilar to our own discussions about misinformation/disinformation as we might like, and many voters are receptive to it. Third, the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War has exogenously impacted the Georgian political system by raising the salience of political stability and non-intervention (the so-called “Second Front” or “Global War Party” framing), while also improving the economy as Georgia acts as a pass-through for goods to Russia and received cash-rich Russian emigres at the same time. This meant that the protests did not have a meaningful economic character, which is often an important catalyst for successful anti-government movements.
- Julian Waller, academic researcher and applied political analyst of authoritarian politics, Russia Studies Research Analyst at the Center for Naval Analysis.
Ineffective Sanctions
The final key factor cited by respondents, four out of the nine surveyed, was the limited scope or ability of sanctions by the U.S. and European NATO Allies, which they argued failed to impose meaningful costs on Georgian Dream officials.
The EU and the US have recently taken firmer stances after years of accommodation: the EU cancelled high-level meetings and withheld some funding, and the US curtailed its strategic partnership with GD. For a party that long relied on a pro-Western façade, these moves have been crucial. Yet stripping Ivanishvili’s regime of a pro-Western veneer has not removed the vast financial and administrative resources it uses to retain power. Targeted Western sanctions are especially important because Ivanishvili’s inner circle, which occupies key positions and sustains his grip on power, holds substantial financial interests in the West. Irakli Rukhadze, the founder of GD’s propaganda outlet, for instance, has some of his companies registered in the Netherlands. Mayor of Tbilisi, Kakha Kaladze, owns a 7-room apartment in Paris. Additionally, many GD officials send their children to Western universities even as they promote anti-Western propaganda domestically.
While individual sanctions have been imposed by the US, the UK, and some EU member states, they remain limited in scope and mostly symbolic in nature. Meanwhile, stronger measures—such as the MEGOBARI Act—have stalled in the US Congress, and the EU’s proposal for personal sanctions has been blocked by Hungary and Slovakia. This restrained response has allowed Ivanishvili to maintain the resources underpinning his hegemonic, coercive rule—though his recent persecution of regime loyalists indicates that even the existing measures are prompting infighting and cracks within his circle.
Now that GD’s rule depends primarily on coercion rather than a pro-Western legitimacy, it is the foundations of that coercive power - its financial resources - that must be targeted. With opposition leaders jailed and civil society under pressure, stronger and coordinated international measures could prove decisive.
- Anastasia Mgaloblishvili, doctoral researcher at the Freie Universität Berlin, ReThink.CEE at the German Marshal Fund of the United States.
Heavy international coercion and sanctioning the regime as well as maintaining internal public pressure can bring the country back to the democratic statecraft, but the window of opportunity is closing fast. If this happens, then we might witness one of the biggest defeats of democracy in Europe since the end of the cold war with far reaching consequences regionally.
- Batu Kutelia, Senior Fellow at the Delphi Global Research Center, former Georgian Ambassador to the United States and former head of Georgia’s Foreign Intelligence Service.
While international actions have made little difference in shaping the success or failure of democracy movements throughout recent history, certainly financial pain points can help, including financial sanctions on the regime and its enablers. But as we’ve seen elsewhere, even the harshest of sanctions and isolation are not enough to unseat an anti-democratic regime. Change will have to come from the Georgian people.
- Laura Thornton, Senior Director for Global Democracy Programs at the McCain Institute.
Concluding Note
Georgian Dream does continues to face notable potential obstacles on a path to a fully consolidated regime, likely most importantly continuing pro-Western sentiment among much of the population. Yet, analyses of Georgian politics should apply consideration as to how the ruling party has thus far successfully embarked on such a radical break with longstanding Georgian political norms (best evidenced by the break with the European Union) and transformed the country’s political environment in a relatively short period of time.
This project, surveying leading Georgia-experts has sought to begin providing answers to that question, finding a complex mix of opposition dysfunction, Georgian Dream authoritarian proficiency, and ineffective international responses.
We hope readers find this project useful and we look forward to providing continual coverage of Georgia in the coming weeks. For ENB subscribers, be sure to look out for this week’s newsletter, which will be coming out tomorrow morning.
Best wishes and thank you for reading,
-The ENB Team
good comments. Perhaps one can add that the key battle is for attention, and that Facebook has proved a mixed blessing for the opposition spectrum. Success requires strategy. Strategy requires hierarchy, to direct effort. Focus is needed, too. Facebook as the main attention space is great for resilience, but not for focus, hierarchy and a forward strategy.
(One quibble: one should retire the term "the opposition" -- you cannot say an intelligent sentence with that as a noun. It's a spectrum so wide and diverse, that a different wording is needed.)